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Abstract 
The theft of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tag identity, commonly referred 
to as tag cloning, is a serious threat to RFID systems.  It can enable an attacker to 
gain access to a secure facility, make fraudulent purchases, or disrupt supply chains.  
It may even enable crimes like financial gain, people smuggling, and drug 
trafficking, terrorism and money laundering.  Presently there is no practical solution 
to defend against tag cloning.  This thesis details research that aims to detect the 
presence of clone tags which may be the first step in defending against them and 
preventing RFID-enabled crimes from occurring.  An intrusion detection system has 
been developed using statistical anomaly detection to identify clone tags.  The 
feasibility of the approach has been tested by evaluating its performance in detecting 
synthesized attacks inside a sanitized RFID audit log.  The results suggest that 
intrusion detection systems can be used to detect cloned tags but that the weaknesses 
of statistical anomaly detection are also apparent when used on RFID data.   
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1 Introduction 
Identity crime, which involves the fraud or theft of people’s credentials, is one of the 
fastest growing crimes of the new millennium.  Perpetrators can use an unsuspecting 
victim’s information for a range of crimes such as financial gain, people smuggling, 
drug trafficking, terrorism and money laundering (ACPR 2006).  Agencies 
responsible for monitoring identity theft report the following statistics:  in Australia 
it is estimated that identity fraud cost $1.1 billion during 2001-2002 (ACPR 2006);  
in the United States during 2003, almost 10 million Americans were victims of 
identity theft, with a total cost to business and consumers of almost $50 billion 
(FDIC 2004); in the United Kingdom, between 2002-2006 identity related fraud is 
estimated to have cost £1.72 billion (Home-Office 2006). 
 Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a means of uniquely identifying 
objects using a combination of tags, readers, and middleware.  Every tag has a 
unique number which identifies the object that it is attached to.  The role of a reader 
is to query tags to obtain their identification number and inform the middleware of 
each tag and associated object’s location.  RFID is being used in many applications 
including physical access control, and supply chain visibility in the item level 
tagging of products.  The global RFID market in 2005 was worth $1.94 billion, 
which is expected to increase to $24.50 billion by the year 2015 (IDTechEx 2005) as 
item level tagging becomes more prolific. 
Unfortunately the tags are vulnerable to identity theft which can enable 
identity related crime to occur.  In systems that use RFID, tag cloning may enable an 
attacker to gain access to a secure facility, make fraudulent purchases, or disrupt 
supply chains.  They may even be able to carry out crimes like those often associated 
with mainstream identity crime.  This is bad news for the more than 1.8 billion tags 
(IDTechEx 2005) that are in currently in existence. 
A practical solution to defend against tag cloning in RFID systems is yet to 
be developed due to the RFID industry’s desire to manufacture commercially 
affordable tags that cost around 5 cents.  It is therefore not surprising to learn that 
researchers have had some difficulty attempting to secure the tags from being cloned.  
More surprising is that researchers have not looked beyond the tag to the readers or 
middleware as possible locations to enforce security.  As these components are 
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strategically positioned on the edge of RFID systems, they could be capable of 
monitoring tag activity to defend against clone tags. 
Intrusion detection may be one security paradigm that could be used to 
defend against tag cloning.  Much like burglar alarms, they monitor the activity 
occurring within a system and respond when suspicious activity occurs.  As the 
behaviour of a clone tag would be abnormal to an RFID system, an intrusion 
detection system may detect and respond to their presence.   
 The aim of this research is to investigate whether it is feasible to apply the 
principles of intrusion detection to detect clone RFID tags.  The detection of clone 
tags would be the first step in defending against them and preventing RFID-enabled 
crime from occurring.   
The organization of this thesis is as follows: Chapter Two will present an 
overview of RFID technology and outline the problem of tag cloning in more detail.  
It will then briefly highlight some of the solutions that have been proposed to defend 
against tag cloning, and it will then present the principles of intrusion detection to 
show how they may be applied to this problem.  Chapter Three will discuss the 
intrusion detection system, called Deckard, which has been developed to test the 
hypothesis.  Testing was conducted in three phases to determine the overall 
performance of the system.  Chapter Four will present the outcome of the tests and 
discuss what they mean in relation to the hypothesis.  Chapter Five will summarize 
the findings and look at how this research may be continued into the future.   
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2 Literature review 
This chapter will discuss how and why the principles of intrusion detection may be 
applied to detect clone tags.  It will do this by firstly giving an overview of what 
exactly RFID technology is.  Then it will examine the threat of tag cloning with 
several examples where clone tags have been used to demonstrate the threat that they 
pose.  A brief discussion of why some of the proposed solutions are impractical to 
the problem is then given.  And finally the principles of intrusion detection are 
outlined to illustrate how they may be useful in defending against tag cloning. 
2.1 RFID overview 
RFID consists of three components: tags, readers, and middleware.  Tags can be 
attached to practically any objects in order to uniquely identify them; clothing, cars, 
animals, or people.  When a tag is in range of a reader, it will respond with its unique 
identification number, its identity, which tells the reader which tag and hence which 
object is within range.  RFID typically assumes, but is not guaranteed, that a tag is 
permanently attached to an object.  This means when a tag is in range of a reader, the 
system believes that it must be the original object presenting the tag back to the 
system. 
In Hamburg Germany, public libraries are using RFID to track the movement 
of books, magazines, and DVD’s.  The technology allows patrons to check-in and 
check-out their items at self serve stations that have a reader at them (Wessel 2006).  
This is possible as every item in the library has a uniquely identifiable tag attached to 
it. 
Specifically, the term “RFID” incorporates a number of contactless integrated 
circuit technologies that operate on the following radio frequencies: < 135 KHz, 
13.56 MHz, 862-915 UHF, 2.45 GHz, 5.8Ghz (Schuermann 2000).  These devices 
include proximity cards which are used for physical access control, and EPC 
Generation One and EPC Generation Two tags, a standard class of RFID tag 
commonly used for item level tracking of products in a supply chain.   
The tags themselves can be passive or active depending on how they are 
powered.  It is important to note however that tag cloning affects all types of tags.  
Passive tags have no on board power supply, which allows them to be smaller - in 
some cases the size of a grain of rice, and also less expensive than active tags.  As 
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they are powered from the radio signal that the reader emits they tend to be short 
range devices.  This allows them to exist in an RFID system for an indefinite time 
period.  And as a result are most the most widespread type of tag, of which there 
were 1390 million sold by the year 2005 (IDTechEx 2005).   
In contrast, active tags have an onboard power supply which enables them to 
be read from a greater distance of 100 feet or more (Garfinkel & Holtzman 2005), 
but it means that their lifespan is determined by the duration of their power supply.  
As these tags are more expensive, they are used in a limited number of high cost 
applications.  There were 410 million active tags sold by the year 2005 (IDTechEx 
2005).   
The reader is responsible for querying tags for their data, and in turn 
transmitting the results of a query back to the middleware.  The middleware is 
typically a database that knows which tag has been attached to which object.  
Therefore the outcome of this process informs the middleware of where a tag and its 
associated object are located. 
2.1.1 RFID applications 
RFID technology is being used in many different applications; from supply chain 
management, to physical access control, and contactless payment systems.  Often 
these systems rely on the uniqueness of each tag to not only identify objects, but also 
to authenticate them.   
In the supply chain, RFID has been used to increase the efficiency of tracking 
items from the manufacturer to the retailer and beyond.  EPC type tags are a special 
type of tag that follows the EPC standard developed by the MIT Auto-ID Centre.  
This standard is now managed by EPCglobal (Garfinkel & Holtzman 2005, p. 19).  
Tags following this standard are the low cost tag of choice in this area.  The use of 
such tags has rapidly increased since the largest retailer in the United States, Wal-
Mart, mandated their use in 2003 for its top 100 suppliers.  Wal-Mart uses EPC tags 
to track item movement within its supply chain (Wal-Mart Opts for EPC Class 1, V2 
2003).  It is aims to use the technology in 1,000 of its 3,900 stores by 31 January 
2006 (Swedberg 2006).  Clone tags in this system would result in an inaccurate view 
of how products were moving through the supply chain.   
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The pharmaceutical industry is moving toward the mass tagging of drug 
products by 2007.  According to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 2004 
report on combating counterfeit drugs, their aim is to limit the potential for 
counterfeit products to enter the supply chain.  The unique number that tags have, 
has been proposed as the means by which each drug purchaser can determine a 
drug’s authenticity (FDA 2004).  The effect of clone tags in this system may mean 
that counterfeit drugs can be sold to consumers.   
The proximity card RFID system is used to control physical access to 
facilities using credit card sized tags called proximity cards.  Each human user in this 
system is given a proximity card that grants them access to, for example, a building.  
To gain access, the user swipes their card within range of the reader-enabled door 
which then verifies the access rights of the card.  In the United States, King’s 
Daughters Medical Centre is using proximity cards to control access to medical 
storage cabinets that contain cardiac medical devices (Swedberg 2005).  In such 
applications, if it is possible for the system to respond to a clone tag then the security 
goals of the system are completely invalidated. 
Another use of RFID technology has been the Exxon Mobil SpeedPass 
contactless payment system.  Its seven million users can make purchases at over 
10,000 locations world wide by simply presenting their SpeedPass tag to a petrol 
pump (Bono et al. 2005).  A reader-enabled petrol pump queries a SpeedPass tag to 
determine its identification number, which tells the system which customer’s account 
to debit.  Clone tags in this system would result in some unhappy customers paying 
for the attacker’s free petrol. 
2.2 Problem of tag cloning 
RFID technology operates under the assumption that every tag is unique.  That is, 
there is no tag with the same identification number.  This assumption allows a reader 
to uniquely identify a tag, and know exactly which object is in range of the reader. 
 However it has been demonstrated by a number of researchers that in fact the 
uniqueness of tags cannot be guaranteed because their identification numbers can be 
cloned (copied).  In essence, tag cloning is the theft of a tag’s identity.  And by 
simply having a clone in the system, an attacker can fool the system into believing 
that it is really identifying the original tag and object.  The attacker can then commit 
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RFID-enabled crimes using the clone tag like: gaining entrance to facilities that are 
protected by proximity cards; making payments using SpeedPass tags; and even 
crimes typically associated with mainstream identity crime such as financial gain, 
people smuggling, drug trafficking, terrorism and money laundering. 
In its most elementary form, an attacker only needs to know the identification 
number of a legitimate tag to clone it.  Tag cloning is perhaps the most serious threat 
to the theft of tag identity, although there are several other potential threats that can 
be carried out by simply obtaining the identity of a tag, as illustrated in  
Figure 1 - Tag identity threat model.  These may be decomposed into two subgroups: 
active attacks and passive attacks.   
 
 
Figure 1 - Tag identity threat model 
2.2.1 Active attacks 
Active attacks involve the real-time theft and replay of tag identity.  Such attacks are 
limited in scope but have the same overall impact as most identity attacks.  These 
attacks include when a tag is removed from an object and then attached to another 
object.  For example, in order to pay less for a product in a supermarket an attacker 
may remove the tag from a bottle of wine, replacing it with a tag they obtained from 
a can of baked beans.  Similarly, users may share their tags with other users; or tags 
may be lost or stolen.  These attacks highlight the problem of assuming that a tag is 
permanently attached to a particular object. 
Misfeasor attacks occur when a user inside an organization is able to alter the 
privileges that have been assigned to a tag.  For example, in the hospital scenario, it 
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would be possible for a nurse to change their tag’s privileges to grant themselves 
access to the medicine cabinet.   
 Kirschenbaum & Wool (2006) have demonstrated that an attacker does not 
even need to physically have possession of a tag to obtain its identity.  Using a 
skimming device, a tag can be read from a distance of about 25cm without a user’s 
knowledge.  Using this method an attacker could perform a relay attack which 
coerces a legitimate tag into revealing its identity, which is then re-presented back 
into the system by the attacker.   
2.2.2 Passive attacks: Tag cloning 
Passive attacks involve an attacker copying and storing a tag’s identity, and then 
replaying it at a later time.  These types of attacks have greater scope than active 
attacks because they can be performed repeatedly over time.  Tag cloning is one 
known example of a passive attack.  In tag cloning, there are three ways in which an 
attacker can obtain the identity of a tag: coerce the tag into revealing it; intercept the 
communication channel between a tag and a reader; or simply guess a tags 
identification number.  These methods are now discussed in greater detail.   
Coercive cloning and interceptive cloning 
Coercive tag cloning is when an attacker directly queries a tag for its identification 
number, whereas interceptive cloning is when an attacker intercepts the identity data 
that is flowing between a tag and reader.  They both result in an attacker obtaining a 
copy of a tags identity.   
Westhues (2005) has demonstrated that the Indala proximity card used by 
many organizations to control physical access to facilities is vulnerable to this sort of 
cloning attack.  His research has demonstrated that with a budget of about USD 
$100, a cloning device can be built that is capable of obtaining a tag’s identification 
number and then replaying it back to the system.     
 Westhues has developed a range of sophisticated cloning devices.  For 
example, the Prox Mark 3 device is capable of performing a number of cloning 
related functions: it can act as a reader, intercept tag-to-reader communications, and 
simulate different types of tags.  The schematics detailing how to build this device 
are free for any self-styled attacker to download from the internet.  All they have to 
do is visit: http://cq.cx/proxmark3.pl 
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Halamka et al. (2006) has demonstrated using a Prox Mark 2 cloning device 
that the human implantable VeriChip tag is vulnerable to tag cloning.  The Prox 
Mark 2 can query a VeriChip, capture its response, and replay it back to the system.  
The Mexican government was relying on VeriChip tags to protect access to a secure 
records room to just eighteen of its workers (Albrecht & McIntyre 2005, p. 179).  
However such attacks now mean an attacker could clone a VeriChip tag and gain 
access to the facilities they are trying to protect.   
Bono et al. (2005) has demonstrated that it is even possible to clone the 
cryptographically enabled Texas Instruments Digital Signal Transponder (DST).  
Although the tag itself is protected by a 40-bit secret cryptographic key, an attacker 
with modest resources can capture enough tag data in a short space of time to crack 
its encryption key, which then allows it to be cloned.  Seven million of these tags are 
used in the Exxon-Mobil SpeedPass system worldwide.  The researchers successfully 
cloned a SpeedPass tag and made purchases with it.  Although there has not yet been 
a reported fraudulent purchase with a cloned SpeedPass device (see Appendix A – 
Communication with SpeedPass, USA), their research has shown just how easy it 
would be to make fraudulent purchases. 
Existential tag cloning 
Existential tag cloning, as defined by Halamka et al. (2006), is when the identity of a 
valid tag in a system can be guessed.  In RFID systems that assign tag identification 
numbers sequentially, non-randomly, or using small number spaces, an attacker may 
simply guess a legitimate identification number which they can then replay back to 
the system.    
Halamka et al. (2006, pp. 8-9) has proposed that the VeriChip tag uses 
identification numbers that may be vulnerable to existential cloning.  They believe 
that VeriChip tag identification numbers come from a small identifier space that may 
indeed assign identification numbers sequentially or non-randomly.  Juels (2005a, p. 
3) has proposed that EPC tags, like those used in the Wal-Mart supply chain (see 
2.1.1) are vulnerable to this sort of attack.  This vulnerability may allow an attacker 
to introduce clone tags into a system, and thus disrupt the visibility of products. 
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2.2.3 Impact of tag cloning 
Tag cloning not only enables RFID related crimes to occur; it has serious 
implications for the overall use of the technology.  This section discusses the 
financial, security and consumer implications of tag cloning for RFID technology.   
 The financial impact of tag cloning to RFID technology may include the cost 
of defence and recovery.  In attempting to defend against tag cloning, manufacturers 
may need to produce tags that can support anti-cloning measures.  Such 
manufacturing additions may increase the cost of the tags.  In addition, systems that 
already have tags present that are affected by tag cloning may need to be replaced 
with non-cloneable tags (if such tags were invented).  The resulting upgrades would 
be costly, not only to the manufacturers but also to consumers.  For example, if it had 
to replace the seven million SpeedPass tags, Exxon Mobil may need to pass the cost 
of new tags onto consumers.   
The security impact of tag cloning may include the loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of the RFID system.  For example, it may be possible for a 
clone tag to be the means by which attacker introduces an RFID virus like that 
proposed by Rieback, Crispo & Tanenbaum (2006).  Such a virus could disrupt the 
entire underlying operations of the RFID technology.   
Reported cases of tag cloning in the media may also impact the acceptance of 
RFID technology.  When consumers hear that tags can be cloned or when business 
hears that the use of RFID may allow attackers to exploit their systems, the 
reputation of RFID may be tarnished.  For example, a number of countries around 
the world including Germany, the United States, and Ireland have begun using RFID 
in passports.  The United States passport uses a 64 Kb RFID chip (Martin 2006) to 
store a user’s personal information.  Concerns about the security of these ePassports 
has been raised in recent examples where the German (Greene 2006)and Irish 
(Lettice 2006) passport chips have been cloned.  Although some of these passports 
have added security to limit the threat, it would be easy to see how these news 
reports can be misunderstood by consumers and negatively influence their decision 
to use the technology.   
If RFID technology is to gain wider acceptance as a means of identification it 
will need to overcome the threat of tag cloning.  Future concerns of the security in 
RFID systems will continue to mount as the ubiquity of tags grows.  It has been 
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forecast that in 2008, 6.8 billion tags will be sold for item level tagging and 15.3 
billion tags for pallets (IDTechEx 2005).  The threat of tag cloning is growing, and 
there need to be effective measures to defend against it.   
2.3 Proposed solutions to tag cloning 
Numerous solutions have been proposed in an attempt to defend against the threat of 
tag cloning.  In Juels (2005b) review of RFID security solutions, it is evident most 
researchers have attempted to deal with the security problems by placing the security 
on or near the tag.  Most of these solutions simply raise a fence around the tag.  
However the fence can only be raised as high as a tag’s capabilities dictate.  As tag 
capabilities are minimal, the fence is also minimal. 
The RFID industry’s desire to produce commercially affordable tags that cost 
around five cents has meant that the capability’s onboard the tag itself have been 
minimized (Sarma 2001).  Some manufacturers already offer tags costing around five 
cents (Collins 2006), and as supporting increased security means an increase in 
production costs, this is not a priority.   
Currently the power, storage, processing and gate resources that are available 
to low cost tags like the EPC tag are insufficient to support the necessary security 
like standard cryptographic functions (Weis et al. 2003, p. 204).  The use of complex 
tag based security like cryptographic functions would require extra power for tags to 
make use of them.  It may not be possible to provide passive tags with extra power 
because in the United States UHF regulations for frequency hopping, limits the time 
allowed for a tag-reader communication to 400 milliseconds.  Also, readers may 
need to query tags less quickly if they are to participate in cryptographic exchanges.  
(Ranasinghe, Engels & Cole 2004) 
 At first thought, it makes sense to put the security on the tag.  After all, it is 
the tag that is being targeted in a cloning attack.  But with the limitations of tags in 
mind, it is hard to envisage a practical solution to the problem being invented in the 
near future.  This thesis examines the possibility of defending against tag cloning at 
the reader or middleware components as these do not suffer from the constraints that 
make defending against cloning at the tag level so difficult. 
The readers and middleware are accepted as being the most expensive 
components of an RFID system.  It is forecast by 2008 that $1.14 billion will be 
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spent on EPC readers and $0.75 billion for other types of readers (IDTechEx 2005).  
Therefore they could bear the cost of security.  Also, as they are already positioned 
on the edge of RFID systems they could enforce security by permitting or denying a 
tag access to the system.  It would be entirely feasible to extend their gatekeeper role 
to monitor the behaviour of tags to determine whether or not they are clones.  
Systems that perform this role for other devices are known as intrusion detection 
systems.   
2.4 Principles of intrusion detection 
‘Intrusion detection is the process of identifying and responding to malicious activity 
targeted at computing and networking resources’ (Amoroso 1999, p. 16).  For 
example, when an attacker attempts to break into a computer network by repeatedly 
guessing a login password, may indicate that an attack is underway.  Intrusion 
detection systems are like burglar alarms for computer systems; they monitor system 
activity in order to detect possible attacks and alert an administrator when an attack 
is detected.  The activity of a subject (typically a human user) can include logging 
into a computer or accessing a file. 
There are two intrusion detection paradigms: anomaly detection and signature 
detection.  The successful detection of attacks is measured in terms of true positives, 
when a system alert detects a true attack, false positives, when they system 
incorrectly identifies activity as an intrusion, and false negatives, when the system 
fails to identify an attack.  The hallmark of a good detection system is a high true 
positive rate, and low false positive and low false negative rate. 
Anomaly detection checks to see if system activity is anomalous based on an 
established profile of behaviour.  It observes and records the behaviour of a subject 
over time and attempts to model this behaviour in the form of a profile.  A profile 
captures the expected or “normal” behaviour of a subject (Amoroso 1999, p. 58).  
The system triggers an alert when activity deviates too far from normal.  For 
example, a system may have a profile that records the number of times a subject logs 
into their computer each day.  On average they may login three times each day.  And 
if their usage were to suddenly and dramatically change from this average to ten 
logins on a single day, the system would perceive this change to be anomalous and 
trigger an alert.   
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The advantage of anomaly detection is its ability to detect unknown attacks.  
As it learns what is normal in a system, anything that deviates from normal will be 
classified as anomalous.  The disadvantage of this is typically a high false positive 
rate as subject behaviour is often open to sudden change, making the establishing of 
a “normal” profile difficult.   
The second approach to intrusion detection, signature detection uses known 
attack descriptions to look for intrusions.  When some activity occurs in the system, 
it checks the observed activity against a knowledge base of known attacks and 
triggers an alert if a match is found.  Such intrusion detection systems are commonly 
used to detect computer viruses.  A virus exhibits code that is quite distinct from 
legitimate code on the computer system, which makes it readily identifiable.   
The advantage of signature detection is its low false positive rate, as the 
system has a clear understanding of what constitutes an intrusion.  The disadvantage 
of this is when an intrusion differs from a signature; the intrusion goes undetected as 
the system does not recognize it.  To achieve adequate performance the signatures in 
the knowledge base also need to be constantly kept up to date. 
 To actually process system activity to look for intrusions, a detection system 
needs to be fed data that represents the subject’s activity.  Audit log files are one way 
of feeding data into a detection system.  An audit log is a record of events that have 
occurred on a host or network.  The variables that are recorded about an event may 
include: date/time of event, identification of the subject initiating the event, and 
identification of the object that subject is acting upon (Amoroso 1999, p. 41).  The 
variability or number of variables that are recorded will determine how well the 
system can make a decision on what constitutes an intrusion.  This is particularly 
relevant to RFID systems as the amount of data available is very limited.   
 The intrusions that can be detected will depend on where the audit data was 
captured, with the major differences being between data collected at a host or from a 
network channel.  Host based systems can detect attacks that are targeted at that 
specific host; whereas network based systems can detect more attacks happening 
throughout the network.   
The timeliness of audit log processing will determine how quickly the system 
can respond to an intrusion.  Processing or updating may occur in real time or 
periodically.  If the system processes or updates in real time, as soon as new data is 
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inserted into the audit log, it can respond to intrusions quickly and may in fact 
prevent them from occurring.  However, if updates only occur periodically, then the 
intrusion has probably already been successfully carried out before it has been 
detected.  This trade-off between timeliness and response is ultimately determined by 
the systems capacity to perform the processing.  (Amoroso 1999, pp. 51-2) 
 A key consideration in processing an audit log is how much of the audit log 
to use.  In anomaly detection the age of the data will determine how accurate profiles 
derived using it will be.  Although the audit log may span several months or years of 
observations, the behaviour of users will change over time.  To overcome this 
problem, Hossain, Bridges & Vaughn (2003) used a sliding window approach to 
retrieve only the most recent audit records.  The window filters out those audit 
records that are too old to be useful.   
 When an intrusion has been detected, the system may respond in any number 
of ways.  A response can range from simply alerting an administrator of the intrusion 
to shutting down the offending user account or network session.  The response is 
generally in proportion to the level of risk the threat poses.  For example, a failed 
number of login attempts may result in the suspect account being suspended for 30 
minutes.   
A large proportion of the principles of intrusion detection have been exhibited 
in the IDES (Intrusion Detection Expert System) model, first proposed by Denning 
(1987).  Since then, it has been used as the basis of many intrusion detection systems 
and the one developed for this thesis will also follow it.  A brief overview of how 
IDES operates follows. 
IDES is general purpose statistical anomaly detection system that monitors a 
system’s audit records to look for abnormal patterns of usage.  It observes the 
standard operations that occur within a target system to detect intrusions, such as 
logins or file accesses.  Observations of subject behaviour that significantly deviate 
from past observations are regarded as intrusions.  
The system models each subject’s behaviour with regard to an object using 
profiles.  A profile characterizes a subject’s past behaviour, based on audit log 
records.  For example, when a subject logs into a computer, the system generates an 
audit record that details the operation’s outcome.  The audit records are then used by 
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the profile to model the user’s log in behaviour which is stored in associated login 
profile. 
A profile characterizes what “normal” behaviour is, using both a metric and a 
statistical model.  The metric stores the value of the current observation and the 
model measures what occurred in the past.  For example, the number of times a user 
logs into a computer today is stored in the metric, and the number of times on 
average they logged into the computer in the past are calculated by the model.  The 
metric is classified as abnormal when it is significantly different from the value 
calculated by the model.  The IDES model used the standard deviation and mean 
model to achieve this.   
The standard deviation denotes a confidence interval that is a measure of how 
far away from the mean a new observation is allowed to be.  The system compares a 
new observation to the threshold that was produced by the model.  It then classifies 
the new observation as either normal, in that it fits the profile, or alternatively as 
abnormal, in which case it is regarded as an intrusion.  
The IDES model proposed a “Location Frequency” profile to measure the 
number of times a subject logs into a system at different locations.  The profile may 
be useful in detecting attackers that log in from locations that legitimate subjects 
never use.   
To assist in understanding how the principles of intrusion detection may be 
feasible in detecting clone tags, a hypothetical scenario is now presented based on 
















Scenario: Proximity card cloning 
Alice is a university lecturer that has a proximity card to grant her access to the 
School of Computing 24-hours a day.  She likes to start work early, typically using 
her proximity card at reader one, between 8:00am and 8.30am during week days to 
unlock the building’s door.  Alice likes to leave work at about 5.00 pm so she can get 
home in time for her favourite television program, in which case she again needs to 
pass by reader one to unlock the door. 
Mallory, a technically savvy undergraduate student wants to access the 
computer laboratories during the evenings so he can download pirated music off the 
internet.  Unfortunately, being an undergraduate he is only allowed to use the 
laboratories during normal office hours.  However this is inconvenient for Mallory’s 
downloading, as it may be noticed by other users.  He therefore decides to clone 
Alice’s proximity card so he can have 24-hour access to the building and come in 
when nobody else is around.   
 
With the principles of intrusion detection in mind, an RFID based intrusion 
detection system similar in operation to the IDES model, could develop profiles to 
model the behaviour of Alice’s card.  One such profile may characterize the expected 
behaviour of Alice’s card’s usage by examining the time of day when it is used. 
 When Alice’s card is used, a reader would create an audit record that detailed 
the usage.  These audit records would be then used to update the profile.  Over time 
the system would develop a model of Alice’s behaviour, of when she most often uses 
her card at what particular time of the day.   
 When Mallory clones Alice’s card and begins using it, his behaviour would 
be different to Alice’s: being the unique individual that he is, he would have his own 
preferred times when he likes to access the School of Computing.  An intrusion 
detection system would use the profile of behaviour that was developed, to detect 
Mallory’s behaviour which is exhibited through the clone proximity card.  If the 
system could detect the clone card, it would then be capable of defending against it; 
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perhaps by terminating its access rights, hence preventing Mallory from committing 
any crime. 
 In summary, the threat of tag cloning poses a serious threat to systems that 
use RFID technology.  Currently there is no practical solution to defend against clone 
tags due to the tag constraints.  The principles of intrusion detection could be applied 
at the reader or middleware level as they do not suffer these constraints.  An 
intrusion detection system could utilize the RFID data that tags produce to develop 
profiles of normal tag behaviour, which may then be used to detect the anomalous 
behaviour clones exhibit.   
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3 Methodology 
The aim of this thesis is to determine whether it is feasible to detect clone Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags using the principles of intrusion detection.  
Detection may be seen as the first step in defending against clone tags and preventing 
RFID-enabled crime from occurring.  It is important to note that intrusion detection 
has never been applied to RFID systems before.   
 In order to evaluate the hypothesis, the principles of intrusion detection have 
been applied in a statistical anomaly detection system.  The detection system, called 
Deckard, was built using the Java programming language.  It processes RFID audit 
log data to look for audit records that a clone tag may have generated.  Its design and 
operation is similar to the detection model, IDES, first proposed by Denning (1987). 
The overall feasibility of the system was evaluated by determining its ability 
to detect attacks (audit records that relate to a clone tag) in an audit log.  This was 
done in three phases; the success of phase one and two would determine whether or 
not it was feasible, in phase three, to investigate the overall attack detection rate.   
The name Deckard is a reference to the character played by Harrison Ford in 
the 1982 Ridley Scott movie Blade Runner.  In the movie, Deckard is a special 
member of the Los Angeles police department who is employed to hunt down and 
retire Replicants; genetically manufactured humanoids (Wikipedia 2006).  This is 
almost analogous to an intrusion detection system detecting clones - in this case 
clone RFID tags.   
3.1 Description of data set 
The data set which was used to develop and test the system was provided by the 
School of Computing (Launceston) in the University of Tasmania (UTAS).  It 
consisted of four sanitized audit logs from their proximity card physical access 
control system.  Briefly, the School of Computing proximity card system controls 
access to different parts of the computing building.  Users of this RFID system are 
students and staff who have 24-hour access to different parts of the building.  There 
are four readers that control access in the building, and a user must swipe their card 
within 2 inches of a reader to unlock the door.   
The sanitization of the UTAS audit logs was undertaken by the system’s 
administrator, to ensure that the privacy of users was protected.  This was done by 
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replacing the original tag numbers with pseudonym numbers.  It was still possible to 
observe that these pseudonyms belonged most probably to students or staff because 
of the reader at which they appeared.  However, it was not possible to know the true 
tag number, and hence the identity of the particular user of any tag. 
 














1 25/11/2004 2/06/2006 554 6909 6892 16 0 1 
2 25/11/2004 1/06/2006 553 7443 7259 153 0 31 
3 25/11/2004 2/06/2006 554 21047 20931 116 0 0 
4 5/12/2004 1/06/2006 543 1238 1212 26 0 0 
    36637 36294 311 0 32 
Table 1 - Proximity card data 
 
It can be seen in Table 1 - Proximity card data, that there were 36,637 audit 
records in total that were generated from 25/11/2004 to 02/06/2006.  The audit 
records detailed the activity of each user’s proximity card.  Sometimes access was 
granted to the card, and in some cases, access was denied.  Deckard was designed to 
only work with those audit records where access had been “granted,” of which there 
were 36,294. 
 
3.2 System architecture and operation 
In its physical form, Deckard is a software program that is situated on a central 
computer that interconnects all of the readers in an RFID system.  It may be regarded 
as a host based anomaly detection system for RFID because it processes audit log 
data that has been generated from activity occurring at a several readers.  It uses the 
standard deviation and mean model to develop profiles of tag behaviour which it then 
uses to look for clone tag behaviour. 
Deckard has been designed using the principles of intrusion detection that 
were described in section 2.4 as IDES.  There are several reasons why Deckard has 
been designed using the this approach as opposed to taking an existing system then 
attempting to apply it to the RFID environment.   
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Firstly, intrusion detection has not previously been used in RFID therefore 
the model proposed by Denning (1987) is a worthwhile starting point as it was 
designed to be general purpose and useable in any environment.  If the approach 
proves successful then it would be worthwhile exploring other techniques. 
Secondly, the RFID environment and the data that it produces are quite 
different from typical intrusion detection domains, which means a specialized RFID 
detection system needed to be designed.  An important consideration is the number 
of variables that are available.  There are numerous intrusion detection systems that 
operate on TCP/IP networks, as detailed by Axelsson (2000, pp. 15-23), which 
typically use data that contains a large number of variables.  In stark contrast, 
elementary RFID systems like the School of Computing proximity card system have 
a limited number of variables namely: tag number, reader number, action/operation, 
date, time.  Therefore the intrusion detection system that would work in RFID needs 
to capable of making a classification decision with only a few variables.  It is also 
therefore worthwhile beginning with a simple classification approach such as that 
provided by standard deviation and mean. 
In essence, Deckard may be decomposed into six logical components, of which 
most are common to all intrusion detection systems (Amoroso 1999, pp. 26-7).  
These are: 1. Target system, 2. Feed, 3. Audit log, 4. Knowledge base, 5. Processing, 
6. Alerts.  These are illustrated in Figure 2 - Architecture of Deckard.   
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Figure 2 - Architecture of Deckard 
3.2.1 Target system 
The target system which Deckard has been designed to operate in may be any typical 
RFID system that has assets worth protecting from RFID-enabled crime.  For 
example, in a proximity card system, it is worth protecting facilities from being 
accessed by attackers. 
 Deckard assumes that the target system is capable of producing data that 
summarizes the activity of its tags.  This means that the system can record the details 
of when a tag is queried into an audit log for processing.  Also, every tag and reader 
should be identifiable.  This way it is possible to identify which tag generated an 
audit record and the reader at which it was generated. 
The performance of Deckard will ultimately be determined by the behaviour 
of the tags.  In this thesis Deckard has been applied to a human based RFID system, 
and it should be noted that configuration and results that are produced may differ 
completely from those produced in, for example, a static supply chain environment.   
3.2.2 Feed 
The feed is the means by which data is delivered to Deckard for processing.  It 
contains data relating to the events that have occurred in the system each time a 
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reader has queried a tag.  A reader is responsible for recording the outcome of a 
RFID read/write operation to an audit record.   
An audit record captures the essential details of an RFID operation as 
follows:  <tag number, reader number, RFID action/operation, date, time>.  The 
possible contents of these fields are visible in Table 2 - Reader two audit log extract.   
It is necessary to ensure that if readers are to be responsible for generating 
audit records, then they need to share a consistent system clock that way that can 
maintain an accurate view of the world.  This enables the correlation of the activity 
of tags between readers.   
3.2.3 Audit log 
The system maintains an audit log file for each incoming reader feed on the 
computer that is running Deckard.  In the current design, an audit log is simply a flat 
text file that contains audit records that are ordered sequentially by date and time. As 
each audit record is generated, it is inserted onto the end of the audit log.   
Table 2 - Reader two audit log extract, illustrates the structure of the audit log 
and each individual audit record obtained from the UTAS audit logs.  Looking at this 
it can be seen that the system has to work with only the five variables contained in it. 
 
Date Time Action/Operation Reader ID Tag ID 
31/05/2006  6:41:38 PM  Granted 2 109 
31/05/2006  5:47:15 PM  Granted 2 126 
30/05/2006  10:07:41 PM  Granted 2 118 
30/05/2006  7:12:11 PM  Granted 2 123 
30/05/2006  7:04:01 PM  Granted 2 109 
30/05/2006  5:34:55 PM  Granted 2 103 
30/05/2006  8:13:18 AM  Granted 2 115 
29/05/2006  7:56:16 PM  Granted 2 118 
29/05/2006  7:33:29 PM  Granted 2 109 
29/05/2006  7:04:39 PM  Granted 2 103 
29/05/2006  6:39:09 PM  Granted 2 123 
Table 2 - Reader two audit log extract 
 
The reason for maintaining individual audit logs for each reader is that 
Deckard can read from those audit logs that have data in them for a current update.  
Realistically in a real-world implementation, the audit log should be a database as 
opposed to a text file as this would improve processing performance and security of 
the data.   
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 It was decided to maintain the audit logs on a central computer (in this case it 
was the computer running Deckard) as this would make it easier for the system to 
access the data.  In the real world, it would also allow the system to more easily 
protect the log from attempted access from attackers that wanted to cover up their 
attacks. 
3.2.4 Knowledge base 
Deckard models the behaviour of each tag in the form of a profile.  The profile 
describes the expected behaviour of a tag based on past observations that have been 
captured in the associated audit records.  A profile follows a generic structure that 
has been adapted from Denning (1987).  It is illustrated in Table 3 - Structure of a tag 
profile.   
 
Profile name: Name of profile 
Operation/action: RFID operation or action: read/write 
Tag number: Identification number of tag 
Reader number: Identification number of reader 
Time of day: Period of day which profile is for: early morning, morning, 
afternoon, night. 
Value: Value of the current observation period 
Threshold: Value of the past observation periods calculated using the statistical 
model. 
Table 3 - Structure of a tag profile 
 
A profile exists for every association between a tag and reader.  This can be 
modelled as follows: <Tag + Reader + Operation + Time of Day>.  For example, a 
profile would exist for: <tag 351 + reader 2 + “read” + “morning”>.  This would 
characterize the behaviour of tag 351 at reader 2 for the RFID “read” operation in the 
“morning” period.   
A calendar day, has been broken down into four discrete periods as the 
behaviour of a tag is expected to be different at different times of the day: early 
morning (00:00-06:00), morning (06:00-12:00), afternoon (12:00-18:00) and night 
(18:00-24:00).  In this way it can model the behaviour of a tag at each period of the 
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day.  For example, in the UTAS proximity card system, the behaviour of tags would 
be different in the mornings when compared to the nights because most students 
come into the building to work during the day.   
The system was designed and tested using a single profile; the “Location 
Frequency Profile” (LFP) that counts the number of times a tag has been used at a 
reader. Based on the information in section 2.4, it was decided that examining the 
usage frequency (how often) of a tag at a reader would be a sufficient indicator of 
whether or not it is a clone.   
When an update occurs, the LFP calculates how many times a tag has been 
used in the current observation period and stores this in its value field.  It uses the 
standard deviation and mean model to calculate a threshold which is the maximum 
number of times the tag could realistically be used based on past observations.  An 
example of what the LFP for a tag looks like is given in Table 4 – Location 
Frequency Profile.   
 
Profile name: Location Frequency Profile 
(LFP) 
Operation/action: Read 
Tag number: 351 
Reader number: 4 
Time of day: Morning 
Value: 4 
Threshold: 6 
Table 4 – Location Frequency Profile 
 
It can be seen that the LFP for tag 351 shows that this tag has been used four 
times for current observation.  Using the standard deviation and mean model, it has 
been calculated that the most times this tag could possibly be used without triggering 
an alert, is six.  The processing of this profile would classify the value field as being 
normal because it does not exceed the threshold field.  The threshold is determined 
by an administrator specified DFM value.  It is the number of deviations away from 
the mean a new observation is allowed to be.  This will be elaborated on in section 
3.2.5.2. 
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3.2.5 Processing 
In order to look for possible intrusions (clone tags), Deckard updates each profile 
every 24-hours.  When an update occurs, it firstly retrieves all of the data that relates 
to that profile, it then calculates the value and threshold fields, and checks to see if 
the value field exceeds the threshold field.  If the value does exceed the threshold, 
the observation is classified as an anomaly, that is, some audit records in the update 
relate to a clone tag, and an alert is triggered. 
Amoroso (1999, p. 51) outlines a significant disadvantage of processing audit 
logs periodically: that the system cannot respond to attacks that are currently 
underway.  However it was decided that Deckard should in fact update its profiles 
periodically for several reasons.  Firstly, periodic updates would reduce the burden 
on the detection system’s processing engine.  If for example, an RFID system is 
producing a large number of audit records for every query a reader performs on a tag, 
triggered updates would mean the processing engine would update after every audit 
record had been generated - which is a lot of processing. 
Secondly, the concept of a session in RFID is not definable.  That is, a tag 
and reader may undergo several read or write operations before a session is actually 
complete.  Updating periodically ignores the difficulty in determining the start and 
end of a session. 
3.2.5.1 Retrieve data 
When an update occurs the first step is that the processing engine retrieves each 
profile in turn along with its data from the associated audit log.  The data in the form 
of audit records represents the activity at a particular reader.  For example, when 
updating reader two’s morning profile for tag number 351, the entire audit records 
relating to this profile would be retrieved from reader two’s audit log. 
 Deckard retrieves audit log data in the form of an observation data structure.  
The observation essentially groups all of the audit records for the profile by date.  
The number of observations that are retrieved is determined by the window.  This 
specifies how far the profile should look back into the audit log to determine what 
constitutes a tag’s normal behaviour.  Typically there is a trade-off between how 
much past data should be used versus the accuracy of the profile.  For example, the 
audit log used contains observations that have been accumulated over several years.  
However over time tag behaviour will have changed, therefore it is the role of the 
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window to determine how much of this data should be used to get an accurate 
description of a tag’s current behaviour.   
 Deckard allows the window to be specified in terms of a percentage of the 
audit log size.  For example, a window of 25% will retrieve the last 25% of audit log 
records if they are available. 
The windowing approach has been used in Deckard for several reasons.  
Firstly, it does not discriminate audit records based on age.  This would therefore be 
useful in systems that exhibited sporadic tag usage.  For example, the distribution of 
audit records in an audit log would fluctuate according to seasonal factors like when 
a user was scheduled to work, or when university lectures were held.   
 The disadvantage of the windowing approach used by Deckard is that it 
simply does not consider the age of an audit record.  If an audit record, for example, 
was generated one year ago, the window may actually catch that record in the 
retrieval process.  The age of audit records will determine the accuracy of classifying 
a tag’s normal behaviour.  It is common knowledge that over time humans change 
their behaviour, so old audit records may be completely irrelevant in describing how 
a tag is currently being used. 
3.2.5.2 Statistical model to compute value and threshold 
The second step the system undertakes after each profile and its associated data has 
been retrieved, is to calculate using the standard deviation and mean model, the new 
value and threshold fields.  As proposed by Denning (1987) the standard deviation 
and mean statistics are applicable to event counters that have been accumulated over 
a fixed time period, such as the event counter the LFP uses to count the number of 
times a tag has been used.   
 
Using the LFP as an example, the system computes the value and threshold as 
follows: 





Detecting Clone RFID Tags Methodology 
26 
Date Number of audit records (number 





14/02/2005  3 (current observation/update period) 
Figure 3 – Hypothetical tag usage for tag 351 in audit log 
 
To calculate the value field: 
1. Count the number of audit records that exist in the current observation. That 
is, the number of audit records for the current update period. 
• For the current update period (14/02/2005), tag 351 has been used 3 
times. 
2. Store this count in the value field of the LFP. 
 
To calculate the threshold field: 
1. Count the number of audit records that exist for each past observation for the 
profile. 
2. Calculate the population mean and population standard deviation on these 
values. 
• The past observations are all of those dates before the current update 
period (14/02/2005).  The code calculates the standard deviation on 
the entire population.  It uses the same algorithm that Microsoft Excel 
uses which is illustrated in Figure 4 - Microsoft Excel STDEVP.  And 
its accuracy was validated using Microsoft Excel STDEVP function.   
 
 
Figure 4 - Microsoft Excel STDEVP formula 
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3. Using the administrator DFM (number of deviations from mean) value, 
determine the maximum number of times that a tag may be used for the 
current observation (the maximum possible value).   
The standard deviation of an entire population (denoted by symbol σ) 
represents the typical distance from any point in the data set to the centre 
value which is the mean value.  Calculating the standard deviation, measures 
the distribution of the values (Rumsey 2003, p. 106).   
If the data is normally distributed, or has a bell shape, it is possible to use 
the Empirical rule to describe the distribution of the data set.  The Empirical 
rule states that 68% of the values are one deviation away from the mean (σ1 
or ± 1 deviation), 95% of values are two deviations from the mean (σ2 or ±2 
deviations), and 99.7% of values are three deviations from the mean (σ3 or 
±3 deviations).  (Rumsey 2003, p. 148).  Testing to see if the data was indeed 
normally distributed was undertaken in section 3.3.1.   
The DFM is used by the profile to calculate the distance that the value 
field can be away from the mean in both directions (lower and upper, or ±).  
It has three possible values: σ1, σ2, σ3.  Using a DFM of σ1, tells the system 
that the value field can be no more than one standard deviation away from the 
mean that was calculated on the past observations.  Whereas a DFM of σ3, 
allows the value field to be up to three deviations away from the mean before 
an alert is triggered.  In essence it is a confidence interval that specifies how 
strict the intrusion detection system is at classifying tag behaviour.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 5 – DFM confidence interval.  In the LFP, this means the 
least number of times a tag has been used, and the maximum number of times 
a tag has been used.  Therefore the DFM specifies how far away from the 
mean a current observation is allowed to be.   
 




Figure 5 – DFM confidence interval 
 
Using tag 351 as an example let the DFM equal σ2. The value field 
would equal 3 for the current update that was carried out on 14/02/2005.  
The population mean of past observations would equal 3.5, and population 
standard deviation of past observations would equal 1.12.  The threshold 
would be calculated to be 5.74, which is the value at 2 deviations from 
mean.  Thus, the value (3) would be classified as normal because it is under 
the threshold (5.74). 
 
3.2.5.3 Compare value to threshold 
When the value and threshold have been calculated, Deckard simply uses an if-then 
statement to determine whether the value exceeds the threshold:  “If the threshold is 
exceeded then trigger an alert.”   
3.2.6 Alerts 
An alert has been modelled in the system in form of an activity record.  Activity 
records encapsulate the outcome of an update.  An activity record is set to true when 
an alert is triggered by the statistical model. 
 Deckard has not been designed to respond to alerts although this would be the 
next step once the system was capable of detecting clone tags.  A response could 
range from simply signalling to the administrator of an RFID system that a clone tag 
had been detected.  Alternatively, the response could be automatic: readers could be 
informed of the suspect clone tag which could then be prevented from being useable 
in the system.  For example, in the proximity card system, a suspect clone tag could 
be prevented from gaining access to the building.   
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3.3 Testing 
To determine the system’s feasibility the system was tested in three phases using the 
Location Frequency Profile (LFP) for the morning period.  Phase One was to 
determine the distribution of the data which would indicate if the system was using 
the correct number of DFM.  Phase Two was to determine whether the system could 
model the behaviour of each tag without any attacks present.  And, the key in 
determining the validity of the hypothesis, Phase Three was to determine whether the 
system could establish profiles of normal tag behaviour and then use these to detect 
clone attacks. 
3.3.1 Phase one: initial validation 
The aim of phase one was to determine if the data was normally distributed.  The 
outcome of this would indicate whether the system is correct in using the Empirical 
rule and thus using only three DFM values of σ1, σ2, σ3.  If this was not the case, the 
system would need to use Chebysev’s Inequality theorem and thus more than three 
DFM values.  Testing for this phase was undertaken on a subset of the UTAS audit 
logs using Microsoft Excel in the following manner: 
 
For each tag in the test set: 
1. Count the number of times it had been used on each date. 
2. Calculate the population mean and population standard deviation of these 
values.  The standard deviation formula used was STDEVP. 
3. Using a chart of standard normal distribution determine where the values fall 
within the chart. 
4. Verify that standard normal distribution exists by calculating the percentages 
of the values that occur at σ1, σ2, and σ3 from the mean.   
 
3.3.2 Phase two: performance of classifying behaviour 
The aim of phase two was to determine the performance of the system to classify the 
behaviour of tags on an attack free data set, and to determine the optimum look back 
window.  The outcome of this would indicate the underlying error rate of the 
standard deviation and mean model, and whether normal behaviour of tags could 
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actually be modelled.  The ability to model a subject’s behaviour is an underlying 
requirement of anomaly detection as discussed in section 2.4.   
The tests in this phase were undertaken using the LFP (see 3.2.4) for the 
morning period for all readers, using all data that had been “granted”.  Logically the 
data for this would act as the data feed (see Figure 2 - Architecture of Deckard) for 
Deckard.  It can be seen in Table 5 - Tag activity at each reader, how many tags 
would be involved in this phase by examining the “morning” rows.   
 
Reader 







Matching Tags as 
% of Total Seen  
1 93 Early Morning 37 40% 
   Morning 65 70% 
   Afternoon 78 84% 
   Night 84 90% 
2 151 Early Morning 38 25% 
   Morning 61 40% 
   Afternoon 76 50% 
    Night 79 52% 
3 312 Early Morning 151 48% 
   Morning 258 83% 
   Afternoon 279 89% 
   Night 301 96% 
4 43 Early Morning 2 5% 
   Morning 22 51% 
   Afternoon 19 44% 
    Night 25 58% 
Table 5 - Tag activity at each reader 
 
The ability of Deckard to model tag behaviour may be seen as a classification 
problem.  Given an audit record, the system needs to classify it as either normal or 
anomalous.  The performance of a classifier is typically measured in terms of its 
error rate: in Deckard this is the number of times it classifies an audit record as being 
anomalous when in fact it is normal.   
The standard way of predicting the error rate of a learning procedure like this 
is using stratified ten fold cross validation.  The data set is divided into ten parts, 
each part is held out in turn and the learning scheme is trained on the remaining nine-
tenths; then its error rate is calculated on the holdout set.  The learning procedure is 
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executed a total of ten times, on different training sets to yield an overall error 
estimate known as the true error rate.  (Witten & Frank 2000, p. 126) 
It was decided that ten fold cross validation (with no stratification) would be 
undertaken for each DFM setting (σ1, σ2, σ3) as these would each produce different 
optimum window’s and true error rate’s.  This would indicate how the true error rate 
and optimum window were influenced by the DFM (or strictness of the system). 
Prior to testing it was predicted that as the DFM increased (the system 
becomes less strict), the true error rate would decrease.  The window was initially set 
at four fixed values (25%, 50%, 75%, 100%) with the aim of finding an overall 
window that would represent the optimum look back period for all tag profiles. 
 
Ten fold cross validation was undertaken as follows: 
1. Partition the audit log into ten partitions of approximately the same number 
of audit records in each.   
2. Using the LFP: Hold out the first partition, called the test set, and determine 
the window that produced that lowest classification error using the remaining 
nine partitions, called the training set.   
3. After determining the window that produced the lowest error rate on the 
training set, use it to determine the error rate of the test set. 
 
 This is repeated ten times, each time with a different test and training set.  
The ten error estimates are then averaged to produce an estimate of the true error rate 
for the LFP.  This is illustrated in Figure 6 - Audit log 10 fold cross validation.   
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Figure 6 - Audit log 10 fold cross validation 
 
The pseudo code for the algorithm that was used to perform the validation process is 
illustrated in Figure 7 - Validation algorithm.   
For each threshold (s1, s2, s3) { 
 -For each window w=25, 50, 75, 100; 
-For each training and test set combination; 
For window (w){ 
For each tag profile (training set) { 
   Error RateUpdate profile (w); 
 } 
 } 
Optimum wWindow that produced lowest error rate for tag; 
 
 For each tag profile (test set) { 
  Error RateUpdate profile (optimum w); 
} 
 Average window & average error rate; 
} 
Figure 7 - Validation algorithm 
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3.3.2.1 Limitations on the method 
There are several known limitations on the method that may have affected the 
accuracy of the true error rate estimate. 
Stratification of the data was not undertaken even though Witten & Frank 
(2000, p. 127) believe that stratification improves results slightly, it was not 
performed on the audit logs because the data is time series dependant.  So changing 
the ordering of the audit records would have changed the semantics of the data.   
The partitioning of the audit log may have overrepresented some tags audit 
records in the partitions.  The potential issues that this may have caused have most 
likely been minimized however, using the standard partition size of ten.  In addition, 
the cross validation of the datasets ensures that eventually all data is used in the 
testing and training phases (Gutierrez-Osuna, p. 7).  
The audit log data that Deckard was tested on had been sanitized prior to it 
being made available for its use in this research.  In order to preserve the privacy of 
individual users, the sanitization process changed every tag number with a 
pseudonym that was in no way related to the original tag number.  Mell et al. (2003, 
p. 15) believes that sanitization may remove the content of the background activity 
and produce an unrealistic representation of the environment.  However this is not 
believed to be an issue for these audit logs as the underlying association between tag 
identity and audit records was preserved. 
There was also the potential for attacks to be present in the audit log without 
the systems knowledge.  Without any way of verifying this, the system assumes that 
no attacks are present.  In addition, the presence of pre-existing attacks may have 
been minimized as testing in this phase was repeated a number of times on a large 
sample size. 
And finally, this phase was only tested using a single profile (LFP) for a 
single time period.  Therefore different profiles or different time periods may 
produce entirely different results.  The potential for this to occur has been minimized 
as the tests were repeated on audit logs for all four readers, which provided a large 
amount of data to test on (see Table 1 - Proximity card data). 
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3.3.3 Phase three: performance at detecting attacks 
The aim of phase three was to determine the systems ability to actually detect clone 
tags in an audit log.  This would be the overall indicator in determining the feasibility 
of this intrusion detection system.  The question that needed to be answered was: 
how different does attack behaviour need to be for it to be detectable?   
An attack is represented in an audit log as an audit record representing when 
a clone tag has been used.  This phase involved inserting a number of attack audit 
records throughout the UTAS audit log for reader four, and seeing if Deckard could 
identify these attacks from the normal records. 
It can be seen that there would be 22 tags involved in this phase.  In actual 
fact, this number was reduced to 11 tags because some tags did not have enough data 
to adequately represent the problem of tag cloning.  For example, tags with less than 
four observations were discarded because inserting attacks at three points in the audit 
log (as this phase was about to do) would not work out fairly. 
The testing for phase three was undertaken by first inserting attacks into the 
data.  The data was then fed into Deckard, which went about updating the LFP; 
classifying the audit records as either normal or as anomalous.  After the profile had 
been updated, the system checked to see if the data that was used in an update 
contained an attack record. 
A confusion matrix recorded the outcome of each profile’s updates.  It 
contained information about the system’s ability to make correct classifications and 
incorrect classification.  True positives and true negatives are correct classifications 
when the system correctly classifies an observation as containing an attack or not 
containing an attack.  The false positives and false negatives are classifications when 
the system misclassifies an observation as either containing an attack, when in fact it 
does not, or when it fails to detect the presence of an attack.   
Using the values in each confusion matrix, it is be possible to calculate some 
quantitative measures of the systems performance at detecting clone tags.  More 
information on the theory of confusion matrices can be obtained from Witten & 
Frank (2000, p. 138).  As stated in section 2.4, the hallmarks of a good intrusion 
detection system are a high rate of detection (high true positive rate), and a low false 
alarm rate (false positive rate). 
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Figure 8 - Detecting attacks, shows the algorithm that the processing engine 
of the system used to determine if a classification was true or false.  The system 
increments one of four counters each time a profile is updated to record the outcome 
of an update:  the true positive counter is incremented when an attack is correctly 
detected; the false positive counter is incremented when an attack incorrectly 
detected; the false negative counter is incremented when an attack is missed; and the 
true negative counter is incremented when no attack is detected in an update that did 
not contain attacks. 
 
If (value > threshold) 
{ 
 ++alerts; 
 if (alertsInPeriod > 0){ 
  ++TruePostives; 
 } 
 else{ 
  ++FalsePositives; 
 } 
else{ 
 if (alertsInPeriod > 0){ 
  ++FalseNegatives; 
 } 
 else{ 
  ++TrueNegatives; 
 } 
} 
Figure 8 - Detecting attacks 
 
The values in the resulting confusion matrices could then be used to produce 
the detection rates.  They allow the system to evaluate the classification in relation to 
the other values in the confusion matrix and are a better indicator then simply 
examining the individual values.  The formulas of how they would be calculated 





Figure 9 - True positive rate 
 
• The proportion of positive cases that were correctly identified. 
 
True Positive Rate =  
False Negatives + True Positives 
True Positives 





Figure 10 - False positive rate 






Figure 11 - Precision 
• The proportion of the predicted positive cases that was correct. 
 
3.3.3.1 Synthesizing attack data in the audit log 
As this phase was detecting the systems ability to detect attacks, it was necessary to 
insert some attacks into the data set.  Attack audit records were inserted into the audit 
log in two of the ways that could represent the scenario in section 2.4.  Firstly, an 
attacker could use a clone tag a number of times in a time period; this was labelled 
the attack intensity.  For example, an attacker uses a clone tag three times in one 
morning on a particular date.  Secondly, an attacker could use a clone tag several 
times over a sustained time period; this was labelled the attacked frequency.  For 
example, an attacker uses a clone tag every two weeks.  Figure 12 - Synthesizing 
attacks in audit log, illustrates how attacks were inserted.   
 
 
Figure 12 - Synthesizing attacks in audit log 
 
False Positive Rate =  
True Negatives + False Positives 
False Positives 
Precision =  
False Positives + True Positives 
True Positives 
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It was hoped that elevating the frequency and intensity of the number of 
attacks would provide the answer to the question of how different attack behaviour 
needs to be from normal behaviour in order for it to be detected by Deckard.   
 
Attack data for each tag was inserted as follows:  
1. The audit records for each tag were extracted from the audit log and counted.   
2. Three positions in the data were identified at locations 25%, 50%, 75% of the 
number of records in the audit log.  For example, if the audit contained 100 
records, then location 25% would be at record 25 of the log.   
3. The audit record at this point that was present was copied and then reinserted 
into the same position n number of times based on the attack intensity setting.   
4. This was repeated at locations 50% and 75%. 
5. Then the process was restarted, at the next intensity level. 
 
For example, the program initialized with a frequency of 25% and an 
intensity of one attack.  This means that the audit log for each tag had a one attack 
audit record inserted into it at 25% of the data.  The system would then update all its 
profiles in an attempt to detect this single attack and the results recorded into a 
confusion matrix.  Then, the intensity was increased to two and process repeated up 
to an intensity of three.   
At this point, intensity was reset to one attack, but the frequency of attacks 
was increased to two.  This means attacks were now being inserted at two locations 
in the audit log - 25% and 50%.  The process of increasing the attack intensity was 
repeated, until finally, attacks had been inserted at the three frequency locations 
(25%, 50%, and 75%). 
 
3.3.3.2 Limitations on the method 
There are several known limitations on the method that may have affected the results 
in the confusion matrices.   
 The attacks that were used in the audit log may not realistically interact with 
the background activity (Mell et al. 2003, p. 15) because they were inserted 
synthetically.  This may mean that the system is given an unfair advantage at 
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distinguishing attack records from legitimate audit records.  The only way that this 
could be evaluated would be to compare the performance of the system using an 
audit log that did have “real” attacks in it.  However this was not possible because 
such an audit log was not available.   
 The statistical model that has been used to model behaviour in the system is 
influenced by the attack audit records.  The system does not remove those audit 
records that were classified as anomalous, therefore they go onto be used in the 
future classification of audit records.  It was decided that discarding these audit 
records would not be suitable for this implementation because of the underlying true 
error rate that was determined in section 3.3.  That is, discarding data may result in 
legitimate data or normal behaviour being removed from the audit log.  On the other 
hand, it may be argued that in keeping those records that did not produce an alert 
may in fact be anomalous, as there are times when the system will fail to detect 
attacks. 
 Another limitation on the system may be that in some way it is predisposed to 
trigger alerts coincidently where attack records have been inserted in the audit log.  It 
was demonstrated in section 3.3, that there is a degree of error already present in the 
classification of tag behaviour.  Thus it may be possible that attacks have been 
inserted into those erroneous periods where alerts are already occurring.  It would be 
possible to verify this by recording the locations in section 3.3 that triggered alerts 
and comparing them to the locations that triggered alerts in this phase.  However in 
the real world this is hardly feasible.  Therefore it was decided that the best way to 
overcome this would be to simply insert attacks at more than one location in the audit 
log to reduce this possibility.   
 Section 3.3.2.1 briefly discussed the potential problem of pre-existing attacks 
in the original audit log.  Mell et al. (2003, pp. 15-6) believes that such attacks would 
pose a problem in establishing the false positive rate of the system.  For example, if 
the system were to classify a period as containing an attack, when the synthetic data 
was not inserted into that period, it may in fact be detecting a pre-existing attack that 
existed in the original audit directly from the beginning.  The pre-existence of attacks 
in the audit logs is impossible to know or verify. 
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4 Results and Discussion 
The following chapter examines the results that were produced during the three 
testing phases (see 3.3) to determine the feasibility of using the principles of 
intrusion detection to detect clone RFID tags. 
As is most often the case, as one setting in an intrusion detection system is 
changed, the results that the system produces will vary.  Therefore Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient has been used throughout the results to indicate the association 
between different variables.  More information on the theory behind Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient can be obtained from Jaisingh (2000). 
4.1 Phase one results 
The outcome of visual inspection of the standard deviation chart for those tags that 
were tested indicated that the data is normally distributed. Table 6 – Standard 
deviation results for tag 351, illustrates the distribution of values for tag 351.  It can 
be seen that by three deviations from the mean (σ3), all of the data has been 
described.   
 




Table 6 – Standard deviation results for tag 351 
 
These results correspond to the results one would expect if the data was indeed 
normally distributed.  The results indicated that the data is indeed normally 
distributed, which means that Deckard is able to validly use the Empirical rule to 
generalize the data and it is therefore sufficient to use three DFM settings.  Had this 
not been the case, the system would need to use Chebysev’s Inequality theorem and 
thus more than three DFM settings. 
4.2 Phase two results 
The testing for phase two required approximately 40 hours of processing time to 
produce an estimate for the all audit logs.  The computer hardware the tests were 
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conducted on was: Centrino 1.7 Ghz laptop, 1 GB RAM, Microsoft Window XP 
service pack 2.  This time is not the time Deckard would actually take to detect clone 
tags if it was operating in a real environment.  The tables that are presented in this 
section are summaries of much larger tables. 
 The first round of tests used a lower and upper bound.  That is, a minimum 
and maximum number of times a tag could be used.  For example, as seen in Figure 5 
– DFM confidence interval, specifying a DFM of σ2 would mean that the value had 
to fit between -2 and +2 deviations from the mean of past observations.   
The results of these tests can be seen in Table 7 - Lower and upper threshold.  
It can be seen that the true error rate of the system decreases as the DFM is increased 
from σ1 to σ3.  That is, as the threshold of the system is made less strict, from σ1 to 
σ3 DFM, the system will produce fewer errors.  This is visible in Pearson’s 
correlation coefficient which indicates a strong negative association between the true 
error rate and the DFM.  For example, for reader 1, at a DFM of σ1, the true error 
rate is 26.87%, whereas at a DFM of σ3, the true error rate is 12.52% 
 In order to achieve this, there is however a trade-off in the amount of data 
that is required.  It can be seen that the average window (amount of data needed) 
increases as the true error rate declines.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicates a 
strong positive association between the average window and the DFM.  That is, as 
the thresholds become less strict, the system needs to look back further into the audit 
logs to produce a lower error rate for the lower thresholds.   
 In summary, this means that the system will produce fewer errors as the 
thresholds are relaxed, but the system will need to look back further in the audit log 
to do so.   
 
  Average Window % True Error Rate % 
Reader σ 1 σ 2 σ 3 σ 1 σ 2 σ 3 
1 82.5 90 100 26.87 16.48 12.52 
2 90 95 100 29.36 15.13 12.13 
3 100 92.5 87.5 24.39 14.76 11.86 
4 97.5 97.5 100 28.69 18.71 16.65 
 
92.5 93.75 96.88 27.33 16.27 13.29 
       
 Pcc  
 
Pcc   
 0.97   -0.95   
Table 7 - Lower and upper threshold results 
Detecting Clone RFID Tags Results and Discussion 
41 
 
A second round of tests was undertaken, this time with only an upper limit on 
how often a tag can be used in the LFP.  The results that were produced after 
removing the lower DFM bound can be seen in Table 8 - Upper threshold.  It can be 
seen that the same association between the thresholds, window and true error rate are 
present.  However it can also be seen that the true error rate and the amount of data 
needed to produce the error rate is significantly decreased.  For example, for reader 
1, a DFM of σ1 will produce an error rate of 17.63% but requires a window of 65%, 
whereas at a DFM of σ3 produces an error rate of 9.89%, but a window of 95% is 
required.   
 
  Average Window % True Error Rate % 
Reader σ1 σ2 σ3 σ 1 σ 2 σ3 
1 65 87.5 95 17.63 12.53 9.89 
2 75 80 92.5 20.38 12.73 9.76 
3 50 85 82.5 17.05 11.61 9.21 
4 85 97.5 100 19.03 14 11.94 
 
68.75 87.5 92.5 18.52 12.72 10.2 
       
 Pcc 
  
Pcc   
 0.95 
  
-0.98   
Table 8 - Upper threshold results 
 
In summary, the outcome of phase two indicates that by simply using an upper 
bound on the threshold, the error rate and window will be much smaller.  The tables 
of results also indicate the optimum configuration of the window for phase three.  
Also, based on the findings, the true error rate is small enough to conclude that the 
system can model the behaviour of tags.  Therefore it is worthwhile pursuing stage 
three to test the systems performance at detecting clone tags. 
4.3 Phase three results 
The results of phase three were individual confusion matrices for each tag at each 
possible configuration of attack frequency and attack intensity, and each DFM 
setting (σ1, σ2, σ3).  These have been summarized into Table 9 – Attack intensity 
and frequency results, which shows the effect the intensity and frequency of attacks 
has on the true positive rate, false positive rate, and precision. 
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The results from phase two indicated that the true error rate was similar 
across all tags.  Therefore the system was configured according to the results 
produced in phase two, and testing was conducted using the data audit log data for 
reader four as it was thought that the high volume of readings would sufficiently 
represent the problem across all of audits.   
 In Table 9 – Attack intensity and frequency results, it can be seen that the true 
positive rate of Deckard in detecting attacks improves as the intensity of attacks 
increases.  That is, as an attacker uses a clone tag more often in a period, more 
anomalous audit records appear in the audit log, which makes the attack easier to 
detect.  For example, at an attack frequency of 1, the true positive rate of DFM σ1 
increases from 63.64% to 81.82% as the attack intensity increases from 1 attack to 3 
attacks.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicates that a strong positive association 
between the true positive rate and the intensity of attacks exists in this example, and 
for a DFM of σ2 and σ3 at each attack frequency setting. 
 
    
True Positive Rate % False Positive Rate % Precision % 
Frequency Intensity σ1 σ2 σ3 σ1 σ2 σ3 σ1 σ2 σ3 
1 1 63.64 63.64 63.64 10.77 4.71 2.66 26.67 45.19 52.78 
  2 81.82 63.64 63.64 9.69 3.49 2.52 33.48 49.44 53.70 
  3 81.82 81.82 72.73 7.04 3.01 2.39 43.94 60.33 60.00 
  Average 75.76 69.70 66.67 9.17 3.74 2.52 34.70 51.65 55.49 
  Pcc 0.87 0.87 0.87 -0.97 -0.97 -1.00 0.99 0.97 0.92 
2 1 63.64 45.45 36.36 10.09 4.20 2.76 36.61 48.89 54.63 
  2 81.82 63.64 36.36 7.65 3.61 2.48 51.30 60.83 57.41 
  3 86.36 81.82 50.00 6.15 3.12 2.17 58.48 68.33 63.33 
  Average 77.27 63.64 40.91 7.96 3.64 2.47 48.80 59.35 58.46 
  Pcc 0.94 1.00 0.87 -0.99 -1.00 -1.00 0.98 0.99 0.98 
3 1 63.64 36.36 24.24 10.29 4.35 2.88 42.08 51.85 54.63 
  2 78.79 57.58 30.30 7.63 3.49 2.59 55.54 65.95 61.11 
  3 84.85 72.73 39.39 6.33 3.23 2.27 64.15 71.95 65.83 
  Average 75.76 55.56 31.31 8.08 3.69 2.58 53.92 63.25 60.52 
  Pcc 0.97 1.00 0.99 -0.98 -0.95 -1.00 0.99 0.97 1.00 
Table 9 – Attack intensity and frequency results 
 
In addition, it can be seen that Deckard produces less false positives as the 
attack intensity increases.  For example, at an attack frequency of 1, DFM σ1 has a 
false positive rate of 10.77% which decreases to 7.04% as the attack intensity 
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increases from 1 to 3 attacks.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicates a strong 
negative association between the intensity of attacks and the false positive rate.   
 The result of the true positive and false positive rate can be seen to cause the 
precision of the system to increase.  The precision increases when the intensity of 
attacks increases.  For example, at an attack frequency of 1, DFM σ1 has a precision 
of 26.67% which increases to 43.94% when the intensity of attacks increases to 3 
attacks.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicates that there is indeed a strong 
positive association between the attack frequency and the precision. 
 However, as promising as these results may seem, as the frequency of attacks 
increases, the overall performance for DFM σ2 and σ3 decreases.  That is, as attacks 
occur more frequently, the system’s ability to differentiate attack audit records from 
normal audit records declines using a DFM of σ2 and σ3.  For example, DFM σ2 at 
an attack frequency of 1 and attack intensity of 1 has a true positive rate of 63.64%.  
However as the attack frequency increases to 3, the true positive rate actually 
declines to 36.36% at the same attack intensity.   
It is evident in Table 10 – Average attack frequency, which is an extract of 
the average rates that were presented in Table 9 – Attack intensity and frequency 
results, that the false positive rate of DFM σ2 has a weak negative association with 
the attack frequency, and the false positive rate of DFM σ3 has a weak positive 
association with the attack frequency.  This means that as the frequency of attacks 
increases, the false positive rate will decrease slightly for DFM 2, but actually 
increase for DFM 3.  In contrast, the false positive rate of DFM σ1 decreases as the 
frequency of attacks increases, as indicated by the strong negative association 
between these two variables by Pearson’s correlation coefficient.  This means that as 
attacks become more frequent, a DFM σ1 will actually produce less false positives. 
 
  
True Positive Rate False Positive Rate Precision 
Frequency 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
1 75.76 69.70 66.67 9.17 3.74 2.52 34.70 51.65 55.49 
2 77.27 63.64 40.91 7.96 3.64 2.47 48.80 59.35 58.46 
3 75.76 55.56 31.31 8.08 3.69 2.58 53.92 63.25 60.52 
Pcc 0.00 -1.00 -0.97 -0.82 -0.48 0.51 0.97 0.98 0.99 
Table 10 – Average attack frequency 
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 DFM σ1 also maintains an overall average true positive rate of 76.26% even 
when the frequency of attacks increases.  For example, DFM σ1 at an attack 
frequency of 1 has an average true positive rate of 75.76%.  When the frequency of 
attacks increases to 3, it can be seen that the true positive rate is the same at 75.76%.  
In contrast, the true positive rate of DFM σ2 and σ3 declines dramatically as the 
frequency of attacks increases.  Pearson’s correlation coefficient indicates that there 
is no association between attack frequency and true positive rate for DFM σ1, 
whereas there is a strong negative association between attack frequency and true 
positive rate for DFM σ2 and σ3.   
These findings are on par with similar statistical intrusion detection systems.  
Ye & Chen (2001) developed a statistical anomaly detection system based on the 
Chi-Square statistic which processed audit log data.  It utilized the standard deviation 
statistic during its threshold calculation, and achieved a detection rate of 75% when 
processing audit events.  When compared to Deckard’s average detection rate of 
76.26% at DFM σ1, it is very similar.   
In summary, it appears that using a DFM σ1 to classify data will produce the 
best true positive rate of approximately 76.26% which will remain relatively 
unchanged even when the attack frequency increases.  And the false positive rate for 
DFM σ1 will actually continue to decrease as the frequency of attacks increases.  
This means the performance of the system configured to use a DFM of σ1 will 
improve as more attacks occur.  In contrast, DFM σ2 and σ3 are severely affected in 
their ability to detect attacks, as the attacks become more frequent.   
In the real world, this means that if an attacker was using a clone tag 
frequently in an RFID system, DFM σ1 would be capable of detecting approximately 
76.26% of audit records that the clone produced; whereas the performance of DFM 
σ2 and σ3 are severely affected as the attacks become more frequent.  Therefore as 
the frequency of attacks increased, they would actually indicate that fewer attacks 
were occurring.  Hence, to get a good rate of detection, Deckard must use the 
strictest DFM setting of σ1.   
What do the above findings really mean in relation to the hypothesis - that it 
is feasible to detect clone Radio Frequency Identification tags using the principles of 
intrusion detection? 
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The performance of the system in detecting clone tags showed that an 
average true positive rate of 76.26% and false positive rate of around 9.17% are 
attainable when the system uses the strictest DFM of σ1.  These results are quite 
promising for systems that do not have any means of detection, as their current rate 
of detection would be 0%.   
However in RFID, the costs of misclassification, when the system mistakenly 
classifies a tags behaviour as anomalous are significant.  For example, in the 
SpeedPass application, a false positive rate of 9.17% would mean an unacceptable 
number of false alerts.  This may mean that in the best case an administrator has to 
spend a lot of time manually examining whether an alert is indeed the result of a 
clone tag, and in the worst case if the system responds to alerts, many users of valid 
tags are prevented from making payments at Exxon Mobil petrol stations. 
Although an intrusion detection system such as Deckard may be capable of 
detecting a large percentage of clone tags, the cost of misclassification may hinder its 
feasibility in the real world. 
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5 Conclusion 
The research that was undertaken in this thesis investigated whether it is feasible to 
detect clone RFID tags using the principles of intrusion detection.  The outcome of 
phase one showed that normal distribution of the data could be assumed, which 
meant that it was sufficient to test the system using three DFM settings. 
 The outcome of phase two showed that Deckard could indeed model the 
normal behaviour of tags, but with some degree of underlying error.  It also showed 
the optimum window that would produce the lowest true error rate at each DFM 
setting. 
 And the outcome of phase three, which was the phase that determined the 
overall feasibility of using the principles of intrusion detection, showed that Deckard 
has a true positive rate of 76.26% when the strictest DFM setting is used.  This 
detection rate is on par with similar intrusion detection systems.  However, in 
Deckard, this detection rate comes at a cost of an average false positive rate of 
9.17%.  Although this does decrease as the frequency of attacks increases, the 
feasibility of using this intrusion detection system may be prohibited in a real world 
application like SpeedPass because of the degree of misclassification. 
 
5.1 Further work 
The research that has been presented in this thesis has shown the feasibility of using 
the principles of intrusion detection to detect clone RFID tags.  To make the system 
more feasible in the real world, the short comings of statistical anomaly detection 
need to be improved. 
The windowing approach could be improved by incorporating a weighting 
score that considered how old the data was.  As a profile’s accuracy to model a tag’s 
normal behaviour is dependant on the age of the data, it may be possible to place 
more confidence on a classification as being anomalous if the age of the data was 
considered. 
The system could incorporate more context about the RFID system and the 
data.  Deckard modelled time in terms of periods of a day, but this could be extended 
to consider the seasonal influences that affect the behaviour of tags.  For example, in 
the School of Computing proximity data, tag usage would also be dependant on 
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when university lectures were on, and when holidays occurred.  Therefore 
incorporating some out-of-band information may give the system more intelligence. 
In addition to this, it would be possible to incorporate some common 
knowledge, rules or signatures into the detection process.  For example, the physical 
constraints of an RFID system could be modelled using a graph.  The time and 
distance between readers could be used to determine whether the time between tag 
appearances was physically possible. 
And finally it would be entirely worthwhile to investigate more complex 
classifiers like neural networks or data mining as opposed to using a statistical 
approach like standard deviation and mean.  Although any classifier would need to 
be capable of working with the low dimensional data that RFID systems produce. 
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7 Appendices 
Appendix A – Communication with SpeedPass, USA 
 
SpeedPass USA was contacted during August 2006 in order to determine what 
security existed in the system to defend against tag cloning.  This is the response that 
was received: 
 
30 August 2006 
 
Dear Mr. Mirowski: 
 
Thank you for contacting Speedpass. 
 
The technology of Speedpass centers around the use of radio frequency signals.  
Speedpass key tags contain miniature transponders, small radio-like devices which 
are preprogrammed with a unique secure ID number assigned when the customer 
completes a simple application.  When a customer uses the key tag at a designated 
Speedpass station the gasoline pump sends out a radio signal which powers the key 
tag allowing it to send back its unique ID code.  Instantly, the Speedpass system 
recognizes the individual customer and activates the pump.   
 
A customer’s credit card information remains outside the Speedpass signal process.  
Speedpass recognizes the specific customer and notifies the centralized billing 
department to charge the appropriate credit card as designated by the customer.  The 
Speedpass system does not contain the credit card information and therefore, others 
can not gain access to the information through the Speedpass system.   
 
Since Speedpass was introduced in 1997, there has not been a reported fraudulent 
purchase with a cloned Speedpass device. In addition, Speedpass Network employs 
other internal controls and anti-fraud protections, which further limit the possibility 
of approving and completing fraudulent purchase transactions. 
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Speedpass Network (Exxon Mobil) has a security guarantee that protects all 
Speedpass customers from fraudulent purchases made using their Speedpass device.  
Customers are not responsible for unauthorized transactions should their Speedpass 
device be lost or stolen. 
 
We are sure you would appreciate that any detailed information pertaining to 
Speedpass is proprietary and confidential information.  But, we can direct you to our 
website www.speedpass.com and the website of our device manufacturer, Texas 
Instruments. 
 




Speedpass Customer Service 
 
Appendix B – Statistical Java code 
 
The following Java code is an extract out of the Deckard intrusion detection system.  
It was used to calculate the mean, standard deviation of values in the Location 






public class StatCalc  
{ 
    private int count;  
    private double sum;  
    private double squareSum; 
    private double max = Double.NEGATIVE_INFINITY;   
    private double min = Double.POSITIVE_INFINITY;  
  
    public void enter(double num) { 
       count++; 
       sum += num; 
       squareSum += num*num; 
       if (num > max) 
          max = num; 
       if (num < min) 
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          min = num; 
    } 
  
    public int getCount() {    
       return count; 
    } 
  
    public double getSum() { 
       return sum; 
    } 
  
    public double getMean() { 
       return sum / count;   
    } 
  
    public double getStandardDeviation() {   
       double mean = getMean(); 
       return Math.sqrt( squareSum/count - mean*mean ); 
    } 
     
    public double getMin() { 
       return min; 
    } 
     
    public double getMax() { 
       return max; 
    } 
  
 }  
 
Appendix C – CD-Rom 
The following items are available on the accompanying CD-Rom: 
• Phase one results 
• Phase two results 
• Phase three results 
• Source code 
• Audit log data 
 
